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INTHE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
LEMUEL PRION, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
No. 20090839 
Filed March 20,2012 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
Eighth District, Vernal Dep't 
Nos. 931800470 & 941800068 
Attorneys: 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Kris C. Leonard, Asst. Att'y Gen., 
Salt Lake City, Joann Stringham, Uinta County, for plaintiff 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Troy L. Booher, Michael J. Thomas, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant 
JUSTICE LEE authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
CHIEF JUSTICE DURHAM, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, 
JUSTICE PARRISH, and JUSTICE NEHRING joined. 
JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court: 
\l Lemuel Prion pled guilty and mentally ill to three felony 
charges in August 1994, pursuant to Utah Code section 77-16a-
104(3).1 Under the provisions of the statute, Prion was first sen-
1
 Citations to title 77 chapter 16a in this opinion are to the 1994 
Utah Code, as the statute has been amended (albeit cosmetically, 
in ways that presumably would not alter the analysis) since Pri-
on's conviction. All citations to other sections of the code refer to 
the version currently in force. 
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tenced to three terms of varying length, all to be served concur-
rently. As a part of this first sentence, Prion was committed to the 
Utah State Hospital for evaluation. After a stay of several months, 
Prion was released and reappeared before the district court for 
resentencing. Based on the recommendations of the mental health 
facility staff and administration, the district court resentenced Pri-
on to serve his three terms consecutively, nearly doubling his 
prison time. 
f 2 Claiming that his second sentence was statutorily barred 
and violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, Prion moved the district court to correct his sentence 
under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The dis-
trict court denied the motion, and the Utah Court of Appeals af-
firmed that decision in an unpublished per curiam decision. 
Tf3 On certiorari we conclude that, although the sentencing 
statute at issue expressly allows for a recall and resentencing at 
any time during an eighteen-month review period, Prion's resen-
tencing exceeded the bounds of the Double Jeopardy Clause in 
light of the nature and timeframe of this proceeding. Accordingly, 
we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the district court 
for further proceedings. 
I 
•1f4. In August 1994, Lemuel Prion pled guilty and mentally ill 
to three felony charges stemming from two separate criminal cas-
es. He pled guilty to possession of a dangerous weapon in a cor-
rectional facility, a second degree felony, in the first case; and ag-
gravated assault and dealer in possession without affixing a tax 
stamp, both third degree felonies, in the second case. 
f 5 On September 1, 1994, the district court conducted a plea 
hearing to ascertain, among other things, Prion's mental state un-
der the Utah Code's guilty and mentally ill (GAMI) provisions. 
UTAH CODE §§ 77-16a-101 to -104, -202 (1994). Following expert 
testimony on Prion's mental health and medication history, the 
district court found that Prion posed an "immediate physical 
danger to himself or others, including jeopardizing his own or 
others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a correctional or pro-
bation setting, or lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities 
of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, if placed on probation." 
The court further found that "until [Prion's] medication [was] 
2 
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regulated he [could not] be committed to the Department of Cor-
rections/' 
f 6 Pursuant to the GAMI statute, the district court sentenced 
Prion to three separate terms of 5 years, 0 to 5 years, and 1 to 15 
years, disregarding his mental illness. See UTAH CODE § 77-16a-
104(3) (1994).2 Having imposed the sentence terms, the court 
thereafter ordered that Prion would serve his terms concurrently, 
amounting to a maximum of 15 years. 
%7 As a part of his GAMI sentence, the court also ordered that 
Prion be committed to the Utah State Hospital for care and treat-
ment for a period of "no more than 18 months, or until he has 
reached maximum benefit/7 See id. § 77-16a-202(l)(b) (1994).3 The 
district court expressly retained jurisdiction of the case "to alter or 
amend its order" and indicated that, following his commitment 
period with the State Hospital, Prion would again be brought be-
fore the court for reconsideration of his sentence. See id. (stating 
that after the offender's time at the department for care and 
treatment expires, "the court may recall the sentence and com-
mitment, and resentence the offender"). 
Tf8 Five months later, in January 1995, Prion wTas released from 
the State Hospital. In conjunction with this release, the hospital 
submitted a written report to the district court indicating that Pri-
on had reached "maximum hospital benefit" and recommending 
that Prion "be engaged in some type of sex offender program." 
The report was accompanied by a "Review and Recommenda-
tion," outlining Prion's diagnosis, his violent behavior (including 
2
 Utah Code section 77-16a-104(3) (1994) instructs a sentencing 
court faced with a mentally ill offender to "impose any sentence 
that could be imposed under law upon a defendant who is not 
mentally ill and who is convicted of the same offense." 
3
 See also Stale v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, % 11 n.5, 993 P.2d 854 
("Upon a plea and verdict of 'guilty and mentally ill/ the trial 
court imposes any sentence that could be imposed if the defend-
ant were not mentally ill, but orders the defendant committed to 
the state hospital for care and treatment for no more than eighteen 
months, or until the defendant has reached maximum benefit, 
whichever occurs first"). 
3 
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threats to patients and staff), his failure to cooperate with counsel-
ing, and the staffs general belief that he was 'Very dangerous/7 
If9 Following his release from the State Hospital, Prion ap-
peared before the district court for resentencing on March 14, 
1995. Based on its review of the State Hospital's reports and rec-
ommendations and Prion's history, the district court found that 
Prion posed a serious threat of violent behavior and criminal con-
duct and that his "attitude [was] not conducive to supervision." 
In light of these findings, the district court reimposed the same 
prison terms, but ordered that they run consecutively instead of 
concurrently. In doing so, the district court effectively increased 
Prion's maximum sentence from fifteen years to twenty-five years. 
TflO Nearly fifteen years later, on January 16, 2009, Prion filed a 
motion under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
seeking to vacate his second sentence. Prion argued that his se-
cond sentence was illegally imposed because (1) the court lacked 
statutory authority to increase his sentence following imposition 
of the first sentence and (2) the second sentence violated the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. The district 
court denied Prion's motion, reasoning that "the Double Jeopardy 
Clause only protects against re-sentencing when the defendant 
reasonably believes the original sentence is final," citing State v. 
Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, 975 P.2d 476. Since the GAMI statute 
specifically permits a court to recall and resentence the offender 
after his commitment at the State Hospital (a period of up to 
eighteen months), the court concluded that Prion had no legiti-
mate expectation that his September 1994 sentence was final and 
therefore could lay no claim to double jeopardy. 
Tf 11 In an unpublished per curiam decision, the court of appeals 
affirmed the denial of Prion's motion. State v. Prion, 2009 UT App 
219U (per curiam). Following the same logic employed by the dis-
trict court, the court of appeals reiterated that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause "'only proscribes resentencing where the defendant 
has developed a legitimate expectation of the finality in his oriei-
nal sentence.'" Id. at para. 3 (quoting Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, 
Tf 8). Without that expectation of finality, the court of appeals rea-
soned, "there can be no violation of double jeopardy protections." 
Id. 
[^12 The court of appeals therefore concluded that, because the 
GAMI statute allowed the district court to retain jurisdiction to 
.4 
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alter or amend its original sentence and because the district 
court's order "expressly indicated that Prion's sentence would be 
reconsidered" upon his release from the State Hospital, Prion 
could not have legitimately expected that the September 1, 1994 
order constituted his final sentence. Id. para. 4. Accordingly, the 
court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Prion's rule 
22(e) motion. 
.f 13 Prion filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted. On 
certiorari, we owe no deference to the court of appeals. State v. Ar-
ave, 2011 UT 84, ^ 24 & n.9, 268 P.3d 163. Prion's claims that his 
sentence violates both the GAMI statutory regime and the double 
jeopardy protections of the United States Constitution present 
questions of law, which we review for correctness. See State v. 
Samara, 2004 UT 79, .If 9, 99 P.3d 858. 
II 
Tfl4 Prion challenges the district court's denial of his motion to 
correct an illegal sentence on both statutory and constitutional 
grounds. He contends that the State lacked statutory authority to 
increase his sentence when it resentenced him and also asserts 
that an increase constitutes multiple punishment in violation of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
%lo The State disagrees on both counts. It also asks us to affirm 
on an alternative, procedural ground —that rule 22(e) is not an 
appropriate vehicle for Prion's challenges to the legality of his 
sentence. 
f l6 We uphold the procedural propriety of Prion's motion and 
acknowledge that the statute purports to allow a court to increase 
a mentally ill defendant's sentence on resentencing. We reverse on 
constitutional grounds, however, holding that an increase in a 
mentally ill defendant's sentence on resentencing under the 
GAMI statute infringes the defendant's rights under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
A 
\17 The State challenges Prion's motion on the procedural 
ground that under State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, 232 P.3d 1008, rule 
22(e) motions should be limited to the correction of sentences that 
are "patently" or "manifestly" illegal. See id. ^ 9 (citing State v. 
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995), and State v. Telford, 2002 UT 
5 
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51, 1f 5, 48 P.3d 228). In the State's view, rule 22(e) should be re-
served for the correction of sentences that are imposed outside the 
range authorized by statute or beyond the court's jurisdiction. Be-
cause Prion's sentence was authorized by statute and the district 
court had jurisdiction, the State asks us to affirm on the alternative 
procedural ground that rule 22(e) does not encompass challenges 
like the ones asserted by Prion, 
Tfl8 In advancing this argument, the State acknowledges broad 
language in Candedo concluding that an "illegal sentence under 
rule 22(e) includes constitutional violations," id. *| 11, but suggests 
that we construe that language narrowly in a way that forecloses 
its invocation by Prion, id. ^ 9 (noting that "rule 22(e) claims must 
be narrowly circumscribed to prevent abuse" (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The State's challenge to Prion's 22(e) motion is 
rooted in a concern about a tension between the scope of rule 
22(e) under Candedo and our rules of preservation, which ordinari-
ly would foreclose challenges to a trial or sentence not raised dur-
ing the initial proceedings but introduced for the first time years 
later. 
Tfl9 Preservation rules are important, as they enhance efficiency 
and fairness and generally assure that most claims are raised and 
resolved in the first instance by the original trial court. See State v. 
King, 2006 UT 3, If 13,131 P.3d 202. Our rules of procedure recog-
nize exceptions to this general rule, but most claims are barred if 
they are not presented in time to be resolved in the initial pro-
ceedings in the district court.4 That general rule, moreover, ex-
tends to constitutional claims challenging the legal viability of a 
criminal conviction. See Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7, ^ 5, 43 P.3d 
467 (Postconviction Remedies Act's procedural bars extend to "all 
claims, including constitutional questions"). 
4
 See UTAH CODE § 78B-9-106(l) ("A person is not eligible for 
[post-conviction] relief... upon any ground tha t . . . was raised or 
addressed at trial or on appeal.. . [or] could have been but was 
not raised at trial or on appeal "); id. § 78B-9-107(l) (post-
conviction remedies petitioner "is entitled to relief only if the peti-
tion is filed within one year after the cause of action has ac-
crued"); UTAH R. Q V . P. 65C(h)(l) (requiring district court to re-
view post-conviction petitions for frivolous or previously adjudi-
cated claims and accordingly dismiss them). 
6 
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j^20 Rule 22(e) is one of several narrow exceptions to the rule.5 
It preserves an avenue for a later, unpreserved challenge to the 
lawfulness of a criminal sentence, even on grounds not raised in 
the initial trial proceedings. Because an illegal sentence is treated 
as void, it may be raised "at any time." Candedo, 2010 UT 32, •f 9 
(internal quotation marks omitted). As we have recognized, how-
ever, this formulation, if broadly construed, raises the prospect of 
"abuse/" Id. (quoting Telford, 2002 UT 51, f 5). The abuse we 
have warned of would be apparent, for example, if rule 22(e) were 
construed broadly to sanction a fact-intensive challenge to the le-
gality of a sentencing proceeding asserted long after the time for 
raising it in the initial trial or direct appeal.6 A parallel challenge 
to the proceeding leading to a defendant's conviction, after all, 
would be time-barred, see generally Postconviction Remedies Act, 
UTAH CODE §§ 78B-9-106, -107, and it would make little sense to 
elevate challenges to sentencing proceedings over parallel chal-
lenges to the guilt phase of a trial. 
^21 That concern does recommend a narrow construction of the 
constitutional challenges to a sentence that may be asserted pur-
suant to rule 22(e) under Candedo. But although there must be lim-
its on the scope of rule 22(e) motions, we see no basis for foreclos-
ing that avenue for the claims raised by Prion in this case. Both 
grounds he asserts to challenge his revised sentence are consistent 
with the traditional, established bases for a rule 22(e) motion, and 
we accordingly reject the State's procedural argument notwith-
standing our acknowledgement of the need for a narrow construc-
tion of the rule. 
5
 The text of the rule provides that "[t]he court may correct an il-
legal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any 
time." UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e). 
6 See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962) ("[T]he 
narrow function of [the rule] is to permit correction at any time of 
an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial 
or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence/'); State v. 
Clements, 218 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Idaho 2009) (citing to "[a] number 
of state court jurisdictions" that have concluded "that the deter-
mination of whether a sentence is illegal... is a legal question, 
and does not permit an evidentiary inquiry"). 
7 
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f22 Our rule 22(e) is based on an antecedent in the federal 
rules —rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,7 
which until 1987 authorized federal courts to correct illegal sen-
tences.8 Under this rule, the federal courts traditionally defined an 
"illegal sentence" to encompass instances "when the sentence im-
posed exceeds the statutorily-authorized limits, violates the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause, or is ambiguous or internally contradicto-
ry."9 This approach struck a careful balance between the goal of 
correcting illegal sentences on one hand and that of encouraging 
7
 See FED, R. CRIM. P. 35 (1950) ("[T]he court may correct an ille-
gal sentence at any time."). Our rule 22(e) tracks the federal rule's 
original language. See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e) ("The court may cor-
rect an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal man-
ner, at any time."). 
8
 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) (1984) ("The court may correct an ille-
gal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction 
of sentence."). Rule 35 was repealed effective November 1, 1987, 
however, and the new rule eliminated the "illegal sentence" lan-
guage. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 
§ 215, 98 Stat. 1837, 2014. The modern version, enacted in light of 
the newly adopted Federal Sentencing Guidelines, authorized 
courts to correct sentences only when they were the result of 
"arithmetical, technical, or other clear error." FED. R. CRIM. P. 
35(a). Federal offenders facing allegedly illegal sentences today 
may still challenge the constitutional validity of their sentences 
through petitions for habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
9
 United States v. Pavlico, 961 F.2d 440, 443 (4th Or. 1992); see also 
Hill 368 U.S. at 430 (rejecting Rule 35(a) challenge where "[t]he 
punishment meted out was not in excess of that prescribed by the 
relevant statutes, multiple terms were not imposed for the same 
offense, nor were the terms of the sentence itself legally or consti-
tutionally invalid in any other respect"); 26-635 MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE CRIM. PROC. §635App.l02, [3][b] (2011) ("[I]llegal sen-
tences are essentially only those which exceed the relevant statu-
tory maximum limits or violate double jeopardy or are ambiguous 
or internally contradictory."). 
8 
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preservation and finality on the other.10 The "illegal sentence[s]" 
that could be challenged "at any time" by rule were those whose 
defects would be apparent on their face— because they exceeded 
the limits of a statute or the Double Jeopardy Clause or because 
they were facially ambiguous or internally contradictory. Such de-
fects, moreover, would not as strongly implicate rules of preserva-
tion because facial defects of these sorts could easily be corrected 
without the need for factual development in the original trial 
court.11 
[^23 These limits, however, do not foreclose challenges like 
those asserted by Prion in this case. His statutory claim is essen-
tially one that challenges his revised sentence as exceeding the 
limits of the governing statutory scheme. As explained below, 
Prion reads the GAMI statute to foreclose any increase in the sen-
tence initially imposed. His rule 22(e) motion, therefore, is one 
that comes within the traditional bounds of the rule, and we ac-
cordingly uphold it against the State's procedural attack, 
[^24 Prion's constitutional challenge is also procedurally proper. 
Double jeopardy challenges have long been understood to come 
within the scope of the federal antecedent to our rule 22(e), and 
we likewise uphold Prion's challenge under our rule. A sentence 
imposed in contravention of the Double Jeopardy Clause is an "il-
10
 See, e.g., State v. ThorMson, 2004 UT App 9, UK 14-16, 84 P.3d 
854 (holding that rule 22(e) was not intended to correct "ordinary 
or 'rim-of-the-mill' errors"); see also Clements, 218 P.3d at 1147 
(Idaho version of the federal rule is "narrow," and "not a vehicle 
designed to reexamine the facts underlying the case to determine 
whether a sentence is illegal;" accordingly, its use "should be lim-
ited to uphold the finality of judgments"). 
11
 See Clements, 218 P.3d at 1147; see also UTAH R. CRIM. P. 30(b) 
("Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the rec= 
ord and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission 
may be corrected by the court at any time . . . . " ) ; UTAH R. ClV. P. 
60 (allowing a court to correct clerical mistakes "at any time" or 
relieve a party from the effects of a final judgment in the event of 
mistake or inadvertence within three months of entry of the 
judgment). 
9 
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legal sentence" — even under a "narrowly circumscribed" con-
struction of rule 22(e). Candedo, 2010 UT 32, f 9. 
B. 
*P5 On the merits of Prion's motion, we turn first to the statu-
tory question. Prion's statutory argument is based on the GAMI 
statute's provision for a sentence "that could be imposed under 
law upon a defendant wTho is not mentally ill" and its requirement 
that the defendant (a) be committed to the state hospital; (b) sub-
jected to probation; or (c) placed in the custody of the department 
of corrections. UTAH CODE § 77-16a-104(3) (1994). Although the 
statute authorizes a subsequent "recall" and "resentencfingj" of a 
defendant after an initial period of commitment to the state hospi-
tal, id. § 77-16a-202(l)(b) (1994), Prion asks us to construe that au-
thority narrowly. Specifically, Prion argues that the "recall" and 
"resentencing]" proceeding should be limited to a reconsidera-
tion of the defendant's placement (in the state hospital or with cor-
rections), and not to encompass the length of the defendant' sen-
tence. 
Tf26 This argument falters on the ground that it fails to credit 
the broad, ordinary meaning of the statutory term "resentence." It 
is certainly true that a defendant's initial sentence under the stat-
ute implicates a significant structural decision regarding the na-
ture of the sentence and the placement of the defendant—whether 
the defendant should be placed on probation and, if not, whether 
his confinement should be under the supervision of the Depart-
ment of Human Services (in the state hospital) or in the custody of 
the Department of Corrections (in prison). But that is not the only 
decision to be made at the time of sentencing. The initial sentenc-
ing decision includes, of course, the term or length of confine-
ment. And if that is part of the initial sentencing, then a "recall" 
and "resentence," id. § 77-16a-202(l)(b) (1994), encompasses a re-
consideration of that aspect of the sentence as well. 
[^27 Nothing in the ordinary meaning of the term "resentence" 
„ „ ^ ^ - , ~ i . ~ ~ l :— z s .^s -1^^ ,-,r 4.U.-. ,-,.-^4- .-*A*r.-*^^4mA l^r "Dv.4,-%*-. T£ *"Urt ™-»i*-Io1 
i > U g ^ C 5 L 5 a UJULLLLaLlUlL U l ULLC SVJi L a U V ^ a i C U UV X i i U i l , XX LXlt XXLXIXCXX 
"sentence" encompassed a decision regarding the length or term 
of confinement (as it obviously did), then so would a "resen-
tence," as the prefix "re" simply means "'again, anew, [or] over 
10 
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again/"12 Thus, Prion's notion of a "resentencing]" limited to 
placement is incompatible with the statutory text, and we accord-
ingly reject it. 
|^28 The structure of the GAMI statute bolsters this conclusion. 
At the time of resentencing, the court is to consider mental health 
status reports on the offender, including reports of the danger the 
offender may pose to society and himself, his prognosis for remis-
sion of symptoms, the likelihood of recidivism, and the effective-
ness of the mental health treatment he received.13 All of these con-
siderations could play into a judge's determination of the length 
of an offender's sentence, including, of specific relevance to this 
case, whether to run an offender's sentences concurrently or con-
secutively.14 This structure thus confirms what is already evident 
12
 Addis v. Smith, 166 S.E.2d 361, 363 (Ga. 1969) (quoting 
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 
1209 (1966)); see also Belfont Sales Corp. v. United States, 666 F. Supp. 
1568,1572 (Ct Int'l Trade 1987) ("[T]he prefix 're' means 'again/); 
id. at 1572 n. l l (stating that "re" means "Again; —used chiefly to 
form words, esp. verbs, of action, denoting in general re-petition (of 
the action of the verb), or restoration (to a previous state)" (quoting 
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2070 
(2d ed. 1945))). 
tf See UTAH CODE §§ 77-16a-202(3), -203 (1994). These sections 
require the Department of Human Services to prepare and submit 
regular reports to the district court on the status of offenders be-
ing treated by a mental health facility under the GAMI statute. 
Reports are to include updates on the offender's current mental 
condition, progress since commitment, prognosis, the potential for 
recidivism, estimates of the offender's dangerousness to himself 
or others, and recommendations for future treatment. Id. § 77-16a-
203 (1994V 
14
 See id. § 76-3-401(2) (1994) ("A court shall consider the gravity 
and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to 
impose consecutive sentences"); accord id. § 76-3-401(2) ("In de-
termining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or con-
secutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances 
11 
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in the ordinary meaning of the statute's text, which is that a "re-
sentence" encompasses not just a reconsideration of the offender's 
placement but also of the term or length of his confinement15 
^29 We therefore hold that the GAMI statute aims to permit a 
district court to recall, resentence, and even increase an offender's 
sentence following his commitment and release from the state 
hospital. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals insofar as 
it implicitly endorsed this reading of the statute. 
C 
Tf30 Prion also challenges the proceeding increasing his sen-
tence on double jeopardy grounds. The constitutional guarantee 
against double jeopardy "has been said to consist of three separate 
constitutional protections. It protects against a second prosecution 
for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects 
against multiple punishments for the same offense." North Caroli-
of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant"). 
15
 In support of his statutory argument, Prion also cites section 
76-3-405(1) of the Utah Code, which prohibits the imposition of a 
harsher sentence "[wjhere a . . . sentence has been set aside on di-
rect review or on collateral attack." Prion argues that the thrust of 
this statute is "to protect a defendant's right to appeal by eliminat-
ing the chilling effect the threat of an increased sentence after a 
successful appeal might have on the exercise of appellate rights." 
That may be, but section 76-3-405 is inapplicable here for two rea-
sons. First, GAMI resentencing is not the result of appellate re-
view or collateral attack; it is an ongoing procedure directed by 
the trial court. Second, section 76-3-405 does not extend to circum-
stances where "the increased sentence is based on facts which 
were not known to the court at the time of the original sentence, 
and the court affirmatively places on the record the facts which 
provide the basis for the increased sentence." UTAH CODE § 76-3-
405(2)(a). Prion's resentencing was based on newly gathered in-
formation that was not available to the court during the original 
sentencing, which evidence was noted on the record during the 
resentencing proceeding. Section 76-3-405 is accordingly inappli-
cable here. 
12 
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na v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). 
Tf31 A "primary purpose" of the Double Jeopardy Clause is "to 
preserve the finality of judgments." Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 
(1978). But the clause is also concerned with the "personal strain, 
public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial more than 
once for the same offense." Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 
(1977). Thus, the core of the double jeopardy guarantee is a prohi-
bition of a "second trial following an acquittal." Arizona v. Wash-
ington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978). "If the innocence of the accused 
has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclu-
sively presumes that a second trial would be unfair." Id. 
^32 The Constitution also proscribes the imposition of multiple 
punishments for the same offense. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 
Wall.) 163,176 (1873). Yet the double jeopardy protection against 
retrial does not extend with equal force to resentencing. "The im-
position of a particular sentence usually is not regarded as an 'ac-
quittal' of any more severe sentence that could have been im-
posed." Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981). According-
ly, "the guarantee against double jeopardy neither prevents the 
prosecution from seeking review of a sentence nor restricts the 
length of a sentence imposed upon retrial after a defendant's suc-
cessful appeal." Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 730 (1998). 
j^33 "Thus it may be said with certainty that history demon-
strates that the common law never ascribed such finality to a sen-
tence as would prevent a legislative body from authorizing its ap-
peal by the prosecution," United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 
134 (1980); see also id. at 132 (upholding prosecution's statutory 
right to appeal a defendant's sentence against double jeopardy 
challenge). By the same token, standard, established procedures 
for resentencing — for example, on a motion to correct an error in a 
sentence, see Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1947), or 
on a retrial after a successful appeal by a defendant, see Pearce, 395 
U.S. at 719-2016 — do not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
16
 A narrow exception to this general rule was recognized in 
Bullington v. Missouri, which found a double jeopardy problem in 
a case that subjected a capital defendant to the death penalty in a 
new trial after the defendant's successful appeal from a conviction 
13 
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In this sense, it has been said that "double jeopardy principles 
have no application in the sentencing context." Id. 
[^34 That statement, however, cannot be taken to its literal ex-
treme. The government could not, for example, circumvent the 
strictures of the Double Jeopardy Clause by styling a new prose-
cution for a past offense as a mere "resentencing." At some point, 
the imposition of a new punishment could be deemed to raise 
double jeopardy concerns even absent a new trial formally ad-
dressed to the question of the defendant's guilt.17 See, e.g., Ex parte 
Lange, 85 U.S. 163. 
[^35 This case requires us to delineate the boundary between 
the sorts of resentencing proceedings that fall outside the double 
jeopardy prohibition and those that impose multiple punishments 
raising constitutional concerns. The constitutional question pre-
sented here is whether a resentencing proceeding under the 
GAMI statute falls on the permissible or prohibited side of that 
line. 
{^36 In defending the GAMI resentencing regime, the State in-
sists that the clear language of the statute defeats any reasonable 
expectation of finality on Prion's part. This argument is premised 
on language in DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, tying the decision to up-
hold the prosecution's statutory right to appeal a defendant's sen-
tence to the clarity of the statutory language. Quoting Justice 
resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment. 451 U.S. 430, 446 
(1981). But the rule in Bullington turned on the unique nature of 
capital cases, in which "evidence [is] introduced in a separate pro-
ceeding that formally resemblefs] a trial," Arizona v. Rumsley, 467 
U.S. 203, 209 (1984), and the "embarrassment, expense and or-
deal" and the "anxiety and insecurity" faced by the capital de-
fendant at sentencing is "at least equivalent to that faced by any 
defendant at the guilt phase of a criminal trial/' Bullington, 451 
U.S. at 445 (internal quotation marks omitted), 
™ See United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The 
[Double Jeopardy Clause] applies to 'multiple punishment' be-
cause, if it did not apply to punishment, then the prohibition 
against 'multiple trials' would be meaningless; a court could 
achieve the same result as a second trial by simply resentencing a 
defendant after he has served all or part of an initial sentence."). 
14 
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Blackmun's opinion for the Court in DiFrancesco, the State charac-
terizes the decision as hinging on the fact that the government's 
statutory right to appeal was "clear and specific/' thus depriving 
the defendant of any reasonable expectation of finality in his sen-
tence. 449 U.S. at 139. Because the GAMI statute's resentencing 
proviso is equally "clear and specific," the State insists that it 
withstands double jeopardy review under DiFrancesco. Under this 
reading of DiFrancesco, the State contends, Prion never acquired a 
reasonable expectation of finality in his initial GAMI sentence and 
thus the State retained the discretion to resentence him without 
implicating his constitutional rights under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. 
T|37 We reject this reading of DiFrancesco. The clear, explicit na-
ture of a legislative incursion on a defendant's expectation of the 
finality of a judgment or sentence cannot be the end of the double 
jeopardy inquiry. If that were the sum and substance of this con-
stitutional guarantee, the legislature would have unfettered pow-
er to authorize multiple punishments for a single offense so long 
as it did so in unmistakable terms and deemed the new proceed-
ing a resentencing. 
%38 We do not read DiFrancesco to so enfeeble this fundamental 
constitutional right. The double jeopardy landscape under 
DiFrancesco is not as broadly brushed as the State suggests. 
DiFrancesco upholds the propriety of a resentencing on a new trial 
after a successful appeal, but it does so not solely on the basis of 
the "clear and specific" nature of the statutory provision for re-
view of a defendant's sentence upon appeal by the prosecution, 
id., but also in light of the nature of the resentencing proceeding. 
Specifically, and as explained in greater detail below, the DiFran-
cesco decision turned in substantial part on the fact that the resen-
tencing it upheld involved historically "'well established'" mech-
anisms for the correction of improper sentences within limited 
time frames and did not involve a "retrial or approximate the or-
deal of a trial." id. at 134-36 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 720). 
[^39 Thus, DiFrancesco does not give carte blanche authority for 
any resentencing whose statutory prescription is clear and explic-
it. It suggests, rather, that the constitutionality of such a proceed-
ing depends on a number of factors, such as whether the particu-
lar resentencing proceeding at issue has an established pedigree, 
15 
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occurs within a limited timeframe, and approximates the ordeal of 
a new trial. 
f 40 Applying these factors, we hold that the state's resentenc-
ing of Prion under the GAMI statute crosses the constitutional line 
established by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Our holding is based 
on the grounds that Prion's resentencing (1) came under a sui gen-
eris resentencing procedure established under the GAMI statute, 
not one of the historically established mechanisms for resentenc-
ing endorsed in the double jeopardy case law; (2) occurred out-
side the time limits that would apply to established mechanisms 
for correcting an improper sentence; and (3) considered new evi-
dence not presented or even available in Prion's initial trial and 
sentencing. 
1 
[^41 In cases upholding resentencing proceedings against dou-
ble jeopardy challenges, the United States Supreme Court has 
emphasized the historical pedigree of the resentencing mecha-
nism at issue. In Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947), for ex-
ample, the court upheld the correction of an unlawful sentence by 
a trial court on the ground that "[i]t is well established that a sen-
tence which does not comply with the letter of the criminal statute 
which authorizes it is so erroneous that it may be set aside on ap-
peal or in habeas corpus proceedings." Id. at 166 (citations omit-
ted). The sentence initially imposed in Bozza was for a term of im-
prisonment (but no fine) for a crime carrying a mandatory mini-
mum sentence requiring the imposition of a fine and imprison-
ment. Id. at 165 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 2833(a)). In upholding the dis-
trict court's correction of that sentence to add the required fine, 
the Bozza Court cited the settled procedural practice allowing "an 
appropriate amendment of [an] invalid sentence by the court of 
original jurisdiction, at least during the term of court in which the 
invalid sentence was imposed." Id. at 166. Such correction was 
deemed not to raise double jeopardy problems, at least in part in 
light of the availability of settled procedural mechanisms aimed at 
avoiding the prospect of "a game in which a wrong move by the 
judge means immunity for the prisoner." Id. at 166-67. 
^42 The Court's endorsement in Vearce, 395 U.S. 711, of the 
government's right to seek an increased sentence on a retrial after 
a defendant's successful appeal rested on similar grounds. In 
Pearce, the court noted the "[Ijong-established" principle that 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Cite as: 2012 UT15 
Opinion of the Court 
"double jeopardy imposes no restrictions upon the length of a 
sentence imposed upon reconviction/' emphasizing the " settled" 
practice of the courts and the "unbroken line of decisions" up-
holding "the power, upon the defendant's reconviction, to impose 
whatever sentence may be legally authorized, whether or not it is 
greater than the sentence imposed after the first conviction." Id. at 
719-21. 
•J43 The resentencing mechanism upheld in DiFrancesco had a 
similarly established pedigree. In endorsing the government's 
statutory right to challenge the lawfulness of the defendant s sen-
tence on appeal, DiFrancesco noted the "established practice in the 
federal courts" of allowing a sentencing judge to "recall the de-
fendant and increase that sentence, at least . . . so long as he has 
not yet begun to serve his sentence," and emphasized that "histo-
ry demonstrates that the common law never ascribed such finality 
to a sentence as would prevent a legislative body from authoriz-
ing its appeal by the prosecution." 449 U.S. at 134 (citations omit-
ted). "Indeed," the Court observed, "countries that trace their le-
gal systems to the English common law" consistently "permit 
such appeals." Id. 
Tf44 Prion's resentencing under the GAMI statute bore no rela-
tion to any of the standard procedural mechanisms upheld in the-
se decisions. He was not resentenced on a motion to correct a mis-
take in sentencing, as in Bozza. Nor was his new sentence fixed 
after or upon an appeal, as in Pearce or DiFrancesco. Instead, Pri-
on's new sentence was imposed in a de novo hearing convened at 
the end of a lengthy period of evaluation during his confinement 
in the state hospital. The State has not identified any traditional or 
historical basis for such a resentencing. The lack of such a pedi-
gree is a factor that cuts against this resentencing proceeding un-
der the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
2 
TJ45 The cases upholding resentencing proceedings against 
double jeopardy challenges have also noted the limited timeframe 
in which those proceedings have taken place. In DiFrancesco, the 
Court noted that the timeframe for a challenge to a sentence on 
appeal was appropriately brief, acknowledging that, although an 
"appeal may prolong the period" of a defendant's anxiety over 
the prospect of additional jeopardy for his behavior, that anxiety 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATE V. PRION 
Opinion of the Court 
is limited to "the finite period provided by the statute/' DiFrances-
co, Id. at 136. 
1^46 For DiFrancesco, this finite period of anxiety was short— 
the time available to press an appeal.18 The "dangerous special 
offender" statute at issue in that case did permit the sentencing 
court to grant an extension of the time for taking a review of the 
sentence, but the sentencing court could only extend the time by a 
maximum of thirty days beyond "'the expiration of the time oth-
erwise prescribed by law/" Id. at 120 n.2 (quoting 18 U.S.C 
§ 3576). Moreover, this thirty-day extension was available only to 
convicted offenders; the United States was prohibited from ob-
taining such an extension for review. Id. 
[^47 The timeframe for the correction of the defendant's sen-
tence in Bozza was even more limited. The Court's opinion in that 
case emphasized that the trial court's decision to correct the sen-
tence that omitted a statutorily required fine happened "about 
five hours after the sentence was announced." 330 U.S. at 165. 
This resentencing seems parallel to a motion under rule 60(b) to 
correct a judgment on grounds of mistake, a motion required to be 
made within three months of the court's judgment.19 
[^48 These limited timeframes are of constitutional significance 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. DiFrancesco alluded to this 
point, noting that historically "[t]he trial court's increase of a sen-
tence, so long as it took place during the same term of court, was per-
mitted. . . . [and] not thought to violate any double jeopardy prin-
ciple." 449 U.S. at 133-34 (emphasis added) (citing Ex parte Lange, 
85 U.S. (18 WaU.) at 167; Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. at 192-94 (Clifford, 
J., dissenting); 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES § 438 (13th ed. 1789)). 
Our own historical research confirms this assertion. 
[^49 Double jeopardy's historical roots rim deep. The seeds of 
this foundational principle were sewn as far back as the inception 
18
 See FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1) (1979). At the time of his case, 
DiFrancesco would have had fourteen days following the entry of 
the sentencing order against him within which he could appeal 
the sentence as a matter of right. Id. 
i* See UTAH R.CIV. P. 60(b). 
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of the English common law under the reign of Henry II.20 And 
throughout the relevant common law period, the courts embraced 
a system under which a court's authority to revise its judgments 
(including criminal sentences) was restricted to the timeframe 
comprising a "term" of the court. As Lord Coke explained, 
during the term wherein any judicial act is done, the 
record remaineth in the breast of the judges of the 
court, and in their remembrance, and therefore the 
roll is alterable during that term, as the judges shall 
direct; but when that term is past, then the record is 
in the roll, and admitteth of no alteration, averment 
or proof to the contrary. 
3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES § 438 at 260. 
|^50 The common law's "terms of court" grew out of what was 
once "one continual term for hearing and deciding cases," 
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 275-76 (1769). Eventually, 
the church interposed and "exempted certain holy seasons from 
being profaned by forensic litigation," Id. As Blackstone ex-
plained, the terms were "gradually formed from the canonical 
constitutions of the church; being indeed no other than those lei-
sure seasons of the year which were not occupied by great festi-
vals or fasts." Id. The English courts therefore convened only dur-
ing specific terms falling between the most important of Christian 
holidays. Id. at 276.21 Outside these terms, which varied from year 
to year due to seasonal and lunar holidays but typically lasted 
20
 Joshua C. Tate, Ownership and Possession in the Early Common 
Law, 48 AM, J. LEGAL HIST. 280, 280 (2006) ("Many scholars have 
viewed the reign of Henry II (d. 1189), the medieval English king 
most associated with legal reform, as pivotal in the development 
of the common law."). 
21
 See also MICHAEL JONES, A HANDBOOK OF DATES FOR STUDENTS 
OF ENGLISH HISTORY 98-99 (2000). Several statutes passed at vari-
ous points in English history attempted to more precisely define 
the terms. By 1831, the "dates of the terms were fixed as follows: 
Hilary, 11-31 Jan.; Easter, 15 April-8 May; Trinity, 22 May-12 
June; Michaelmas, 2-25 November." Id. at 103; see also 1 Will. 4, c. 
70. 
19 
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somewhere between three and six weeks,22 common law courts 
lacked power to revise their decisions rendered in prior terms. 
f 51 The common law courts abided by the finality of the terms 
of court with such exactness that " matters which were not dis-
posed of at a term had to be started over" in the next term.23 This 
meticulous adherence to the terms system resulted in procedural 
bars on both amending final orders once the term expired and 
continuing trials from one term to the next,24 
1f52 Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, common 
law courts continued to observe the term of court system, retain-
ing the power to substantively amend previously imposed judg-
ments or sentences so long as they did so during the same term of 
court.25 Early American courts adopted this same framework. As 
one nineteenth-century Massachusetts court noted, "[a] judge of 
the . . . court has power to revise and increase a sentence imposed 
upon a convict, during the same term of court, and before the 
original sentence has gone into operation, or any action has been 
had upon it." Commonwealth v. Weymouth, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 144, 
144 (1861). The court clarified that this authority was rooted in the 
common law practice wherein "the record is not finally made up 
until the end of the term or session of the court, when 'the roll/ as 
it is called, is signed and returned." Id. at 145. Until then, the court 
22
 See JONES, supra ^ 50 n.21, at 98-99. 
23
 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 709 (Bernard C 
Gavit ed., 1941). 
24
 Id. ("[A] final judgment [was] not. . . disturbed after the term 
at which it was entered ha[d] expired unless a proper motion for a 
new trial was filed within a designated time/') 
25
 The term of court system was eventually abolished in England 
as part of the Judiciary Act of 1873. Although most American 
states have similarly aDoiiSiied trie term system, some stni retain 
relics of it in their law. See, e.g., Dunlap v. State, 70 So. 3d 1140, 
1143 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011), (affirming a district court resentencing 
because the "judge exercised his inherent authority to alter a sen-
tence until [the] regular term of court expires" (alteration in origi-
nal) (internal quotation marks omitted)) cert, denied, 69 So. 3d 767 
(Miss. 2011). 
20 
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explained, "it remains in the control of the court, and no entry 
therein is deemed to be final, or beyond the power of the court to 
amend or alter it, either for error or other sufficient cause/' Id. 
*[j53 This historical record underscores the constitutional signif-
icance of the timeframe of a proceeding to subject a criminal de-
fendant to resentencing. The framers of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause were undoubtedly familiar with the limits of the common 
law terms of court, including on a court's authority to revise a 
prior sentence.26 And thus they would have seen a resentencing 
proceeding in a new term as legally questionable, as the court in-
timated in DiFrancesco and Ex Parte Lange. 
T[54 Of course the common law notion of a term of court is no 
longer with us today. But we have adopted modern analogs. The 
principal time bar to revising a judgment in modern law is in our 
procedural rules for post-judgment relief, such as rule 60 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (and its federal counterpart). When 
the federal rule was adopted, its drafters indicated an intent to 
abolish the term of court regime and replace it with a more equi-
table, orderly system of post-judgment relief. See 7 JAMES WM. 
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60App.l00 (3d ed. 
2011). The federal rule drafters expressed concerns with the com-
mon law term of court system, under which "the time for vacating 
a judgment rendered early in a term was much longer than for a 
judgment rendered near its end." Id. Yet they still acknowledged a 
need for time limits to facilitate finality, adopting a six-month 
time limit for most motions for relief from a judgment. Id.27 (Utah 
26
 See William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 
44 S.C. L. REV. 411, 414-16 (1993) ("The basic English common-law 
protections were well known to colonial lawyers through Coke's 
Institutes and Blackstone's Commentaries."); see also United States 
v, Vs/ilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1975) ("[Tlhe Double Jeopardy 
Clause . . . . [tracked] the more traditional language employing 
[Blackstone's] familiar concept of jeopardy." (internal quotation 
marks omitted)), 
27
 Later, the committee extended the timeframe to file a 60(b) 
motion to up to one year under certain circumstances. FED. R. Civ. 
P. 60 advisory committee's note to 1946 amendment. 
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later adopted its own rule 60(b),28 modeled after the federal rule, 
but our rule sets a general three-month time limit. UTAH R. Qv. P. 
60.29) 
^55 The resentencing proceeding for Prion under the GAMI 
statute happened well outside the finite, limited timeframe for an 
appeal or a motion for post-judgment relief. Prion was resen-
tenced more than six months after he began serving his initial sen-
tence.30 The extensive time between Prion's initial sentence and 
the resentencing hearing would undoubtedly have been deemed 
problematic in the common law era in which the Double Jeopardy 
Clause wras adopted. A common law court, in fact, would have 
lacked power to revise a sentence after such an extended period of 
time,31 which would have spanned more than one and perhaps 
28
 UTAH R. Q V . P. 60(b). Although rule 60(b) is a rule of civil pro-
cedure, we have allowed criminal defendants to avail themselves 
of it. See, e.g., Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, f 2,150 P.3d 480. The 
civil rules themselves authorize the use of 60(b) in criminal pro-
ceedings: "These rules of [civil] procedure shall also govern in any 
aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable 
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict 
with any statutory or constitutional requirement." UTAH R. Qv. P. 
81(e). 
29
 Utah's rule 60(b) provides courts a mechanism to "relieve a 
party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" for a varie-
ty of reasons, UTAH R. Qv. P. 60(b). Unless the judgment is void, 
has been "satisfied, released, or discharged," or is otherwise ren-
dered invalid, litigants must move for relief under this rule within 
three months. Id. 
30
 Prion's six-month review, moreover, was perhaps on the 
shorter end of the resentencing proceedings authorized under the 
GAMI statute, wThich permits resentencing as late as eighteen 
months after the initial sentence is entered. 
31
 United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67 (1914) ("In the absence of 
statute providing otherwise, the general principle obtains that a 
court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expira-
tion of the term at which it was entered .. . ."). 
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several different terms of court. It is significant, moreover, that 
Prion's resentencing occurred well outside the time frame for any 
motion for post-judgment relief, which is the modern analog to 
the common law term of court. 
[^56 We need not—and do not—hold that a resentencing pro-
ceeding beyond the deadline for a motion for post-judgment relief 
is a per se breach of the double jeopardy guarantee. We simply 
conclude that the timing of a defendant's resentencing has consti-
tutional significance —that the extent of the delay between the ini-
tial and subsequent sentencing weighs in favor of a defendant s 
double jeopardy challenge to the resentencing. And where, as 
here, the defendant's resentencing took place more than six 
months after the original sentence was handed down in a pro-
ceeding that bore no relation to any traditional, established mech-
anism for resentencing, we find that the sentencing scheme ran 
afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause, particularly given the nature 
of the proceeding (as explained below7). 
3 
^57 Finally, the cases upholding resentencing proceedings 
against double jeopardy attacks have emphasized the limited na-
ture of the proceedings at issue. In DiFrancesco, for example, the 
Court recalled the "central" objective of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of providing a "barrier to affording the prosecution anoth-
er opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the 
first proceeding." DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). And although a new hearing allowing the prose-
cution to introduce new evidence would inappropriately "provide 
the prosecution [with] a second crack" at presenting its case, id. at 
140 (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court in DiFrancesco 
noted that the prosecution's appellate challenge to the "dangerous 
special offender" sentence did no such thing. Instead, the Court 
emphasized that the "limited appeal" under the statute "d[id] not 
involve a retrial or approximate the ordeal of a trial on the basic 
issue of guilt or innocence" but was "essentially on the record of 
the sentencing court." Id. at 136. 
[^58 In reviewing the propriety of other sentencing proceedings, 
the Court has explored whether they bear "the hallmarks of [a] 
trial on guilt or innocence." Bullington, 451 U.S. at 439. Likewise, 
the Court has evaluated whether the "embarrassment, expense 
and ordeal" as well as the "anxiety and insecurity" that a defend-
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ant must endure approximate or are equivalent to "that faced by 
any defendant at the guilt phase of a criminal trial/' Id. at 445 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).32 In finding a double jeopardy 
bar to a new penalty-phase proceeding in a capital case m Bulling-
ton, for example, the court distinguished the penalty phase of a 
capital trial from the resentencing proceedings upheld in prior 
cases. Specifically, the Bullington court noted that in those cases 
"there was no separate sentencing proceeding at which the prose-
cution was required to prove . . . additional facts in order to justify 
the particular sentence/' Id. at 439. 
f 59 The case law's focus on the nature of the resentencing pro-
ceeding has roots in broader double jeopardy principles. It has 
been said that the Double Jeopardy Clause "prevents the State 
from honing its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence through 
successive attempts at conviction." Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 
(1982). Moreover, "[rjepeated prosecutorial sallies would unfairly 
burden the defendant and create a risk of conviction through 
sheer governmental perseverance." Id. This protection is para-
mount to double jeopardy because, as the DiFrancesco Court ex-
plained, a second chance at gathering and producing evidence 
might allow the government to "wear down a defendant" with its 
superior resources and obtain a conviction where it otherwise 
might fail. See 449 U.S. at 130. In other words, after "the govern-
ment has failed to prove its case," it should not be afforded a "se-
cond bite at the apple." Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15, 17 
(1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
|^60 At its core, the Double Jeopardy Clause serves as a protec-
tive barrier between" the individual defendant (with limited re-
sources and high personal stakes in the outcome) and the state 
(with extensive resources and little anxiety arising from the out-
come of the case). Although some resentencing proceedings will 
not approximate the ordeal of a trial, others will, in the sense that 
52
 Bullington was perhaps unique in that it involved a capital 
sentencing proceeding, which was "in many respects a continua-
tion of the trial on guilt or innocence of capital murder." Monge v. 
California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998). We find Bullington's analysis 
instructive, however, insofar as the Court looked to these "hall-
marks" of a trial to determine the legitimacy of the sentencing 
scheme under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 451 U.S. at 439. 
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they furnish "the prosecution another opportunity to supply evi-
dence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding/'33 And in 
those cases, the nature of the resentencing proceeding is a factor 
weighing in favor of the defendant who raises a double jeopardy 
challenge. 
*[f61 Prion's GAMI resentencing proceeding implicates these 
concerns. In contrast to the dangerous special offender scheme at 
issue in DiFrancesco, the GAMI statute allows for additional evi-
dence to be gathered and presented to the court in a subsequent 
hearing. Although the ultimate determination of guilt or inno-
cence has already been made, the GAMI resentencing approxi-
mates the ordeal of a trial in that substantive reviews and recom-
mendations are made to the court based on new evidence gath-
ered in connection with the offender's mental health evaluations. 
For that reason, a GAMI resentencing proceeding bears some of 
the hallmarks of a trial and implicates core double jeopardy con-
cerns. 
/[f62 Again, we do not suggest that a resentencing proceeding 
could never conform to the requirements of double jeopardy if it 
involved the presentation of new evidence. But where such a pro-
ceeding does not resemble a traditionally accepted mechanism for 
reopening a final judgment, and where it is convened well after 
the standard timeframe for such review, we find a double jeop-
ardy violation in a proceeding that allows the prosecution to reo-
pen the initial sentencing decision on a de novo basis in light of ev-
idence that is gathered subsequent to the initial judgment and 
sentence. 
Ill 
[^63 We affirm the procedural propriety of Prion's rule 22(e) 
motion and recognize that the GAMI statute purports to allow the 
district court to increase his sentence. We reverse, however, on 
double jeopardy grounds. 
33
 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,11 (1978); see also DiFrancesco, 
449 U.S. at 128 ("'[Cjentral to the objective of the prohibition 
against successive trials' is the barrier to 'affording the prosecu-
tion another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to 
muster in the first proceeding.'") (quoting Burks, 437 U.S. at 11); 
McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321, 323 (Utah 1983) (same). 
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